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Abstract 
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church-Bulgarian Patriarchate is conventionally associated with the 
Bulgarian national identity, statehood, and culture. Recognizing its contribution for their 
preservation, the state has ensured certain privileges to the Church, including regulation of its 
legal status. During the Bulgarian monarchy (1878-1944) and under the 1879 Tarnovo 
Constitution,  Eastern Orthodoxy had been recognized as the official religion of the state 
(Art. 37), and religion was present in the public schools, the army, and the public sphere in 
general. After the fall of the totalitarian communist regime, in the new democratic 1991 
Constitution, Eastern Orthodoxy was recognized as the traditional religion in the state, 
without explicitly providing specific privileges. In the last decades, however, the public role 
and influence of the Church has been increasing. Starting with the government of Simeon 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005) and the adoption of new 2002 Denominations Act, and 
continuing during the terms of Borisov’s three governments (2009-2020), church-state 
relations have developed to the point that the state takes increasing responsibility for the 
well-being of the Church (from ensuring public funding for reconstruction and maintenance 
of churches to paying salaries of clergy). This new approach to church-state relations will be 
analyzed, thus raising questions whether it remains within the initial constitutional frame or 
tacitly shapes and gradually recognizes a new official religion status of the Church vis-à-vis 
the state and society.          
Key words: traditional religion, church-state relations, official religion status, Bulgarian 
Patriarchate, 1991 Constitution, 2002 Denominations Act  
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 1.Bulgarian Orthodox Church during Democratization (1990s): Political Context and 
Public Presence 
The specific public law status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) and Eastern 
Orthodoxy as traditional religion was negotiated in the first years of democratization. It was 
first legally formulated with the adoption of the democratic 1991 Constitution. This status 
reflected the historical role of the BOC for preserving and cultivating Bulgarian national 
identity and culture. The practical dimensions of this status, however, were shaped by the 
overall social and political context, and the complex interplay between different political, 
religious, governmental, and social actors. 
The public presence of the BOC in the first years after 1989 suffered from several 
constraints: first, the heavy legacy of collaboration of the high-ranked clergy with the regime 
between 1945 and 1990, especially with international socialist initiatives (i.e., the 
international peace movement of the socialist countries). This collaboration was initially 
present in nationalist propaganda during the infamous “Revival Process” 1  against the 
Bulgarian Muslim minority. Secondly, the involvement of members of the Holy Synod in the 
communist secret services had in  turn weakened their legitimacy among believers.2 Thirdly, 
the internal tensions within the Holy Synod and the division among its members leading to 
the creation of an alternative church governance (the Alternative Synod) of metropolitans 
(from 1992 to 1998 with some consequences lasting until 2004).3 All these conditions have 
contributed to the problematic public image of the church in the first years of democratic 
transition.  
1
 This process („Възродителен процес“ in Bulgarian) planned and implemented in the last decade of the 
communist regime, included official state-mandated oppressive measures as forceful renaming of Bulgarian 
Muslims (giving them Bulgarian names), jailing of opponents, mass shooting against protesters,  compulsory 
eviction from property, forced expulsion to Turkey, etc.:   https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0509h7n  
(released 24 April 2017). Михаил Груев, Алексей Кальонски, „Възродителният процес“. 
Мюсюлманските общности и комунистическият режим: политики, реакции, и последици (София: 
ИИБМ, СИЕЛА, 2008) [Michail Gruev, Aleksei Kalionski, “The Revival Process”. Muslim Communities and 
the Communist Regime: Polices, Reactions , and Consequences (Sofia: ISRP, CIELA, 2008)] 
2
 Момчил Методиев, Между вярата и компромиса. Българската православна църква и комунистическата 
държава 1944-1989 [Momchil Metodiev, Between Faith and Compromise. The Orthodox Church and the 
Communist State in Bulgaria 1944-1989] (Sofia: CIELA, 2010).   
3
 James Lindsay Hopkins, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving 
Relationship between Church, Nation, and State in Bulgaria (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2008), 
Ch.7.; Spas Raikin, “The Schism in the BOC, 1992-1997”, in: J. D. Bell (ed.) Bulgaria in Transition (Boulder, 
CO: 1998). 
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In the first decade after the democratic breakthrough in the early 1990s, the public 
presence of the Church was significantly affected by the ongoing internal division between 
the Holy Synod chaired by the Patriarch and the Alternative Synod. These divisions were 
fueled by the deep running political division between former communists and new 
democrats; the former established good relations and support for the Patriarch, and 
metropolitans sided with him, while the latter endorsed the alternative group.4   
Significant steps towards reunification of the two groups have been made during the pan-
Orthodox Church Council convened in Sofia between 30th of September and 1st of October 
in 1998, chaired by the Ecumenical Patriarch. The council was attended by six patriarchs (of 
Alexandria, Antioch, Russia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria), as well as by representatives of 
the other autocephalous Orthodox countries. Its session concluded with the publicly 
announced return of the majority of the clergy of the Alternative Synod in communion with 
the recognized Bulgarian Patriarchate.5 
The governmental and political involvement in the internal church issues led to litigation 
cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Members of the Alternative 
Synod claimed violation of their freedom of religion under Art. 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, citing forceful eviction from their churches in 2004 and the 
imposed restraints in exercising their religious practices. The Court ruled against the country, 
reasoning that the Bulgarian authorities overstepped the boundaries of non-involvement in 
denominational disputes. Furthermore, the existing legislation does not fully protect the free 
exercise of religion in accordance with the principles and standards of Art. 9 of the European 
Convention. Thus, in its 2009 judgement, the Court decided that the country has to 
compensate a group of Orthodox Christians, led by Metropolitan Inokentiy of the 
“Alternative Synod”.6 
4
 Janice Broun, “The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Part 3: Under the Second Union of Democratic 
Forces Government, 1997-2001” (2002) 30 Religion, State & Society 4, 365-394 
5
  Ibid. 
6
 For legally significant interpretation of facts, see the ECtHR judgment: Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 412/03; 35677/04, Judgment of 22 January 2009- 
§§ 14-49; §§ 159, 160.  
 ‘The Court finds that while the leadership dispute in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was a source of 
legitimate concern for the State authorities, their intervention was disproportionate. In particular, the pertinent 
provisions of the 2002 Act, which did not meet the Convention standard of quality of the law, and their 
implementation through sweeping measures forcing the community to unite under the leadership favoured by 
the Government went beyond any legitimate aim and interfered with the organizational autonomy of the Church 
and the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention in a manner which cannot be accepted as lawful and 
necessary in a democratic society, despite the wide margin of appreciation left to the national authorities.’ 
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Contrary to the prevailing public expectation in the early 1990s that the Church would 
vocally support the process of democratic political change, with the exception of some high 
clergy and some parish priests, the Holy Synod remained rather silent on political issues. One 
of the reasons for this lack of public engagement is the role played by the members of the 
Synod during the last decades of the communist regime. During an official process of 
disclosure of secret files of agents and informants of the former communist State Security 
service, it was discovered that the majority of the metropolitans and bishops were co-opted 
by the regime at an early stage of their ecclesiastic careers, and they were elected for high 
church offices with the aid of secret services. In 2012, the independent commission dealing 
with disclosures of the files announced that more than two-thirds of the members of the 
Synod had been recruited as secret service agents (11 out of 15 metropolitans). Consequently, 
their public legitimacy had been eroded and the polls measured a significant decrease of the 
public trust in the church (from above 55% to around 40%). Nonetheless, after the election 
and enthronement of the new Bulgarian Patriarch Neophite in February 2013 and 
simultaneous replacement of some older metropolitans with younger bishops (non-related to 
the communist regime), the public trust in the church increased  to above 60% in 2013 and 
remained relatively high in the consecutive years (oscillating around 50%).7    
In providing an objective evaluation of the public presence of the church, it should be 
taken into account that for the last two decades, the Bulgarian society has remained extremely 
secularized, lacking the basic knowledge of the Christian faith, symbols, and rituals. There 
should be no doubt that the high percentage of people (almost 60 % of the population of 7 
million) declaring themselves Orthodox Christians  can be attributed to the traditional 
overlapping between national identity and religious affiliation, as accepted by the majority of 
the population.8  
 
2. Eastern Orthodoxy as “Traditional religion”: The Bulgarian Situation in Context 
After the first democratic elections in June 1990, some members of the Holy Synod and 
the lower clergy were elected representatives in the constituent assembly (Grand National 
7
 National Center for the Study of Public Opinion, March 2013 Survey: http://dveri.bg/xu8u3 (accessed 
10.05.2020). Trust in the Church survey 2019 (published 21.08.2019): https://www.gallup-
international.bg/en/42495/30-years-after/ (accessed 10.05.2020) 
8
 According to the last national census in 2011 the statistics reads as follows: 4 374 135 out 7 364 570 citizens 
declared their religion as Eastern Orthodox Christianity. However, the percentage of people which regularly 
attend religious services and actively participate in the religious life of their community is much lower (around 
10 %): http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R10.aspx (viewed 12.05.2020).  
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Assembly). Their participation in the constitutional debates was recognizable, attempting to 
obtain certain rights and privileges for the BOC. The constitutional formula that was 
introduced in the new democratic constitution defined the role of the Eastern Orthodoxy in 
the society as traditional religion: “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the 
traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria” (Art.13, 3). With this provision, it is only 
acknowledged that Eastern Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority of the population and it 
has existed for a long period of time. This constitutional provision does not secure any 
specific privileged position for the church, though the practices that have emerged and the 
subsequent legislation have moved in this direction. In line with the prevailing liberal and 
democratic character of the 1991 Constitution, it provides for church-state separation (Art. 
13, 2), as well as guarantees the freedom of religion and its free exercise (Art. 37). A 
specified provision bans the use of religious institutions, communities, and beliefs for 
political ends (Art. 13, 4), thus limiting the possibility for religiously motivated political 
extremism.9  
It should be pointed out that the term ‘traditional religion’ conceptually differs from 
“official or state religion” in that it does not confer or protect any specific privileges, 




In Greece the official state status of the Church of Greece is constitutionally entrenched 
in the Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution, stipulating as follows: 
The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The 
Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably 
united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other 
Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic 
and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy 
Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod…  
 
The preamble of the Constitution consists of a direct invocation of the Holy Trinity in the 
Orthodox dogmatic formula: ‘in the name of the holy, consubstantial and indivisible Trinity.’ 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the section of church-state relations is placed at the 
second position in the Greek Constitution, after the section on the form of government; the 
9
 Ina Merdjanova, Religion, Nationalism, and Civil Society in Eastern Europe. The Postcommunist Palimspest 
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 12-13. 
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Church also enjoys a specific constitutional recognition of its function as a protector of the 
text of the Holy Scriptures: ‘The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. 
Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the 
Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is 
prohibited.’ To the special privileges accorded to the Greek Church are the participation of 
high clergy during official ceremonies of solemn oaths taken by the president, PMs and 
ministers invoking the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity (Art. 33, 
par. 2; Art. 59).10 The constitutional protection of the Church is further ensured: there is a 
prohibition of proselytism, which in fact limits the scope of religious activity of non-
Orthodox denominations, despite the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion in 
Article 13. Even in the sphere of public education, there is a constitutional obligation for the 
state to be committed to nurturing the national and religious conscience of the Greek people 
(Art. 16, 2), hence to recognize and support the role of the Church and Orthodox Christianity 
in society. This general constitutional provision is used as a legal foundation of the daily 
prayers at schools.11  
The strong connections between the state and the church are further revealed in the 
public sphere: many national holidays coincide with the most celebrated religious feasts; the 
state continues to pay the salaries of the Orthodox clergy, which enjoy the de facto status of 
civil servants;12 metropolitans are appointed by the president on the proposal of the Holy 
Synod of the Church of Greece. This mode of church-state relations is often defined by 
scholars of religion and politics as sunallelia (“being together”).13  
Beyond its protected constitutional status, in the Greek Church two tendencies often 
collide: the one is focused on nationalism and nation-state while it opposes globalization and 
modernity; the other emphasizes the universality of the Christian faith and the church’s 
mission, addressing positively the process of democratization and globalization.14 
10
 Respecting the freedom of religion and conscience, there is an opportunity for non-religious ceremony.   
11
 Evangelos Karagiannis, “Secularism in Context: The Relations between the Greek State and the Church of 
Greece in Crisis” (2009) Arch. europ. sociol., L, 1, pp. 133–167, 146. 
12
 Though there were considerations and plans in the opposite direction during the final year of Alexis Tsipras 
government, however, in 2019 the New Democracy government agreed to continue the established practice: 
Greek conservatives scrap plans to take clergy off state payroll, Reuters, July 16, 2019: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-church/greek-conservatives-scrap-plans-to-take-clergy-off-state-
payroll-idUSKCN1UB1IW (visited 12.05.2020).  
13
 Basilius J. Groen, “Nationalism and Reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans” (1998) 26 Religion, State & 
Society 2, pp. 116 -118. 
14
 Victor Roudometoff, “Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional 
Disputes’ (2008) 68 Sociology of Religion 1, pp. 67-91, 71-72. 
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 Romania 
In the 1991 Constitution of Romania, alongside the provisions on the freedom of religion, 
the autonomy of religious denominations from the state is safeguarded. The right of religious 
institutions to receive support from the state for its public presence and social mission is also 
guaranteed (“including the facilitation of religious assistance in the army, in hospitals, prison, 
homes and orphanages”–Art. 29, 5).15 It is noteworthy that the religious denomination which 
mostly benefited from this constitutional provision is the Romanian Orthodox Church as the 
predominant religion in the country. The public presence of religion is also visible in the 
official state ceremonies–for instance, in the presidential inauguration ceremony, of taking 
constitutional oath by the president during inauguration ends with the solemn formula of 
invocation of God (“So help me God!” - Art. 82, 2).  
This constitutional regulation, based on the principles of autonomy and cooperation 
between the state and religious communities, has been affirmed after a heated debate on the 
role of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The church’s claims had emphasized its traditional 
role as a national church with significant contributions to the formation of the Romanian 
nation. Though not all groups in the society agreed with such exclusivist claims, the church 
had attempted to influence the legislation in its own favor.  
In December 2006, the new Law on Religious Freedom was adopted, securing to some 
extent the privileged position of the Romanian Church. The law specified the state’s 
recognition of the “important role of the Romanian Orthodox Church” as well as the role of 
“other churches and denominations as recognized by the national history” of the country.16  
Provisions in the law limit religious proselytizing. They are deemed highly restrictive by 
religious minorities (some Evangelical Christian denominations) and independent 
international observers. Questions in regard to other restrictive and discriminatory clauses of 
the law have been raised, though they have remained not properly addressed by Romanian 
institutions. Some of the controversial provisions include restrictive requirements for 
religious associations on eligibility for state support; for instance, religious institutions are 
ineligible to be considered for the preferential status of religious denomination until they 
have reached their twelfth year of practice in the country. Additionally, the state required 
15
 Merdjanova, Religion, Nationalism, and Civil Society in Eastern Europe, pp.15-26. 
16
 International Religious Freedom Report 2018 Romania, US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-
freedom/romania/ (visited 12.05.2020) 
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their membership to represent and maintain a membership minimum of0. 1% of the 
population. Other restrictions include limits on certain forms of the freedom of expression 
and free speech, which are considered violating established religious symbols (Art. 13 of the 
Law).17     
The US Department of State in its annual report on religious freedom assesses the current 
situation in Romania with respect to the legal framework and existing practices. It was 
emphasized that registered religious denominations (the preferential status is limited to only 
18 religious organizations) are eligible for state financial and other support. They have the 
right to teach religion classes in public schools, receive government funds to build places of 
worship, partially pay clergy salaries with state funds, broadcast religious programming on 
radio and television, and apply for broadcasting licenses for their own stations. Under the 
law, the amount of state funding a denomination receives is determined by the number of 
adherents reported in the most recent census, as well as by “the religious denomination’s 
actual needs.” Furthermore, legal provisions allow local authorities to provide additional 
support and funding for religious denominations. Local authorities may legally fund places of 
worship and theological schools belonging to religious denominations, including providing 
funding for staff salaries and building maintenance, renovation, and conservation or 
construction of places of worship. Sharp differentiation between the privileged status of the 
predominant Orthodox Church and religious minorities--especially those not recognized as 
denominations, but simply as religious associations or other civil associations engaged in 
religious activities--raises justified criticisms of existing discriminatory practices with respect 
to their treatment on behalf of the public authorities.18 
The Romanian Orthodox Church continues to play an important role in the public sphere. 
On numerous occasions, the Church has successfully influenced the legislation (e.g. in the 
field of religious education in the public schools); it has addressed the public opinion on 
important issues of bio-ethics (on abortion and euthanasia) and public morals (against 
legalization of homosexuality); politicians regularly seek support for their public campaigns 
by the church leadership and promise to defend their agenda in the decision-making 
process.19  
17
 Cristian Romocea, Church and State: Religious Nationalism and State Identification in Post-Communist 
Romania (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), pp. 33-34. 
18
 International Religious Freedom Report 2018 Romania 
19
 Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe (New York: OUP, 
2011), pp. 148-149. 
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* * * 
Such privileged treatment for the predominant religion could not be found in the 
constitutional status of Eastern Orthodoxy as “traditional religion” in Bulgaria. In the 
constitutional provision (Art. 13, 2) the Bulgarian Orthodox Church per se is not even 
mentioned. Hence, it would be improper to claim there is an establishment clause on 
constitutional level that provides special protection of the Church. The impression, however, 
changes when one turns to the legislation and the dominant practice.  
The current law on religious organizations (Denominations Act) was adopted in 2002 in 
attempt to modernize the existing legal framework on religious entities and to provide 
legislative protection of the Bulgarian Patriarchate weakened by internal division and the rise 
of a movement (Alternative Synod) which for some time enjoyed governmental support 
(1997-2001). The government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005)20 developed very 
good relations with the Patriarchate and took steps to strengthen the position of the officially 
and canonically recognized Holy Synod, vis-à-vis the remnants of the Alternative Synod. 
Thus, the new law has established a privileged role of the Bulgarian Patriarchate including 
special ex lege recognition of its legal personality (there is no need to register as a religious 
institution with the court register as is required for other denominations).  
The preamble of the 2002 law is also indicative of the general principles and objectives of 
the subsequent normative regulations. First, the freedom of religion and equality before the 
law is proclaimed for all persons, regardless of their religious convictions. Second, the 
“traditional role” of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of the country and in the 
development of its culture and spirituality is emphasized. Third, the preamble states that 
legislators pay due respect to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other religions, while 
supporting mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect among them.  
At this point it is important to note that there is a deliberate twist in the legislative 
formula, which maintains constitutional protection of Eastern Orthodoxy as ‘traditional 
religion.’ This is legislatively interpreted and implemented as ‘traditional role’ of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which–in the specific provisions–is clearly defined as the 
Bulgarian Patriarchate, thus outlawing other pretenders like the Alternative Synod and other 
rival groups.   
20
Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is the former Bulgarian monarch who ruled with Regency (1943-1946) after the 
unexpected death of his father, Tzar Boris III in August 1943. Simeon returned in Bulgaria after decades of exile 
and won the parliamentary elections in 2001, and was elected prime-minister by the Bulgarian parliament. 
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Furthermore, several provisions of the new law restate the principles laid down in the 
constitution. Freedom of religion, along with the principle of separation between religious 
institutions and the state and the prohibition of any form of discrimination on the ground of 
religion are stipulated (Art. 1 to Art. 4 of the law).  
The role of the Eastern Orthodoxy for the state and society is further defined (Art. 10) 
along with its traditional character. It is stated that Orthodoxy has “a historical role for the 
Bulgarian state and actual meaning for its state life.” Moreover, the law stipulates that 
Eastern Orthodoxy is represented by the self-ruling (autocephalous) Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church-Bulgarian Patriarchate, which is the legitimate successor of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
and a member of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. It is governed by the Holy 
Synod and is represented by the Bulgarian Patriarch. It is also provided that the Bulgarian 
Church has a legal personality established by the law, while its structure and governance are 
laid down in its statute. As a preventive measure against future divisions, the law prohibits 
persons and groups who seceded from a registered religious institution to use the same name 
as new legal entity or the property and assets of the original religious institution. Practically, 
it means there cannot be established legally a second religious institution named the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, even without claims of a patriarchal dignity and form of 
governance. This entrenchment and protective clause in a 2010 judgement of the ECtHR was 
found as contradicting the standards of the European Convention.21  
 
3. Elevation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church To De Facto Official Religion Status  
In the last decade, the increased public presence of the Church and the governmental 
support for its initiatives raise questions of whether there is ongoing change in its status in 
society that will be followed by legislative intervention. This tendency in no way challenges 
what Ina Merdjanova has called “the neo-secularization” of Bulgarian society under the 
21 However, the ECtHR has considered the 2002 law to be in collision with the standards of the Convention: 
Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria (Just 
Satisfaction Judgment), no. 412/03; 35677/04, Judgment of 16 September 2010, § 49: 
‘In the Court's view, the 2002 Act did not meet the Convention standards of quality of the law, in so far 
as its provisions disregarded the fact that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was deeply divided and left open to 
arbitrary interpretation the issue of legal representation of the Church ... Moreover, although the ex lege 
recognition of the Church cannot be seen as incompatible with Article 9 in principle, its introduction in a time of 
deep division was tantamount to forcing the believers to accept a single leadership against their will. Those 
provisions of the 2002 Act–still in force continue to generate legal uncertainty, as it can be seen from the 
contradictory judicial decisions that have been adopted and the events that have unfolded since the Act's entry 
into force ...’. 
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conditions of globalization and liberal political and social reforms. As Merdjanova has 
observed,  
In Bulgarian society, Orthodox Christianity has remained an important aspect and a 
marker of national identity, and thereby has retained its public visibility. Yet it does not 
have a substantial impact on the worldviews and behavior of those citizens who define 
themselves as Orthodox. Neo-secularization in Bulgaria is not a reincarnation of the 
communist secularization, even though the historic legacies of a pervasive atheist 
ideology and practice cannot be discounted. It is rooted in new sociopolitical conditions 
related to globalization and the neoliberal paradigm, which reinforce and perpetuate the 
prevalence of individualistic discursive practices and erode communal bonding.22 
 
On the one hand, it is the increased activity of the Church that attracts public attention. 
The Holy Synod’s official statements, however, often oscillate between endorsement and 
ambivalence on the issues of democracy and human rights, but with growing acceptance of 
new political realities; small, but strong and active Christian communities continue to shape 
the debates within the church defending the compatibility between Orthodoxy and 
democracy.23  
The Synod has adopted declarations and encyclicals on significant moral-political issues. 
In its positions, the Synod has advised legislators and the government to change provisions in 
the draft bills of the Denominations Act, Family Code, Education Act, Protection of the Child 
Act, as well as to express positions in relation to issues of religious education in public 
schools, ‘in vitro’ fertilization, migration, and refugees. Not all of these statements have been 
positively accepted in the wider civil society and the media. Nevertheless, the Church has 
defended its public role and engagement, thus becoming one of the important players in the 
public debates. These positions sometimes have challenged the established popular views 
(e.g. on the issues of bioethics); on other cases they have relied on constitutional arguments 
and human rights justification.24 
In 2013, in the official statements of the Patriarch and the Holy Synod during the mass 
demonstrations and protest movements against the corrupt political elite and the oligarchy, 
some democratic political ideas were also endorsed–-the right to live under a just political 
22 Ina Merdjanova,  “Women, Orthodox Christianity and Neo-Secularization in Bulgaria,” in Merdjanova, Ina 
(ed.), Women and Religiosity in Orthodox Christian Contexts (forthcoming with Fordham University Press, 
2021). 
23
 Atanas Slavov. Between Endorsement and Ambivalence: Democracy and Eastern Orthodoxy in Post-
Communist South East Europe, CAS Working Paper Series No. 7/2015: Sofia 2015. Available at: 
http://www.cas.bg/uploads/files/WPS-APP-7/Slavov,%20Atanas.pdf 
24
 Encyclicals of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church – Bulgarian Patriarchate:  
http://www.bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=appeal.xml 
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order and limited and accountable government, the idea of the popular consent for the 
government, the right to protest against an unjust and arbitrary rule, and rights defending the 
value of religious and ethnic tolerance. Even before that, in 2011, the Synod issued a 
declaration emphasizing that the principle of justice originates from God and it demands a 
just punishment for committed crimes, and that the state should be responsible for the 
administration of justice. The Synod defended the principle that in cases when the just 
political order is not guaranteed, the people have the right of resistance against an unjust rule. 
Moreover, the basic forms of social justice and solidarity have to be guaranteed for every 
citizen and each group in society; otherwise it is legitimate for them to seek recourse in the 
right of resistance. According to the Synod, the principles of justice and solidarity are the 
fundament of the state and should be implemented by the government.25    
This internal drive in the BOC towards receiving official status could be seen as deeply 
encoded in the more traditional model of church state relations. The new public role of the 
BOC in its relation to the state could be interpreted as a revitalization of the traditional 
Orthodox political-theological concept of symphonia, stripped from its imperial context and 
encapsulated in the modern nation-states in the Southeastern Europe.26 Thus, the doctrine of 
establishing and protecting the “Christian nation,” in each of the nation-states in the region, 
emerged as a synthesis between the religious-political legacy (of the emerging new nations 
from the 19 century onwards emancipating form the over-powerful Ecumenical Patriarchate 
and fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire) and the new political realities of 
sovereign nation-states.27 The political and cultural boundaries of the nations coincided with 
those of the national Orthodox churches.28  
The case of the Church engagement with symphonia and “Christian nation” concepts 
could be illustrated with a decision of the Synod in April 2015. The Church decided to 
include, in the text of the religious services, an invocation of the name of the former 
Bulgarian king (1943-1946)–Simeon II (Saxe-Coburg-Gotha) with the styling ‘the devout 
and Christ-loving Tsar of the Bulgarians Simeon.’ Moreover, this formula was included in 
25
 Послание на св. Синод на БПЦ за мир и народно единство (Encyclical of the Holy Synod of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church for Peace and Unity of the People), 29 September 2011: http://dveri.bg/a8 (visited 
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26
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the liturgical text before the traditional blessing prayer for the government and the people, 
thus receiving liturgical precedence.29 This decision provoked immediate critical reaction 
among active groups of lay members of the church and some members of the clergy, being 
interpreted as a sign of the Church’s involvement in politics and as an act in collusion with 
the established republican constitutional order. It is noteworthy that there was no proper and 
adequate justification of this synodal decision. It would have been seen as more appropriate if 
Bulgaria was still a monarchy in which Orthodoxy enjoyed the status of an official state 
religion. It is widely considered unacceptable, however, that in a constitutional republic 
which does not recognize monarchic and aristocratic ranks, likewise in which the church is 
separated from the state, that it would simultaneously and officially accept the democratic 
constitutional order. Thus, after the active public opposition to the decision, it was not 
implemented in practice. This case also indicates that many members of the high clergy and 
the Holy Synod still endorse the traditional symphonia model intertwined with the nationalist 
ideology, failing to fully appreciate the contemporary democratic and republican model. 
There is also a positive sign: the immediate critical reflection on behalf of the laity and civil 
society shows that within the church, there are communities who openly endorse modern 
democratic constitutional order.     
One of the recent public debates the Church took part in involved human rights 
arguments on the one side (some government institutions and active NGOs), and preservation 
of the so called “traditional values” on the other (the Orthodox Church, Protestant 
denominations and alliances, nationalist-populist and far-right political parties including 
members of the government majority coalition). The case concerned the failed ratification of 
a key Council of Europe human rights instrument, a convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). The Church arguments 
against the Convention were in fact completely detached from its authentic legal meaning and 
official objectives formulated in the text.30 Rather, the Church fought a media-constructed 
fake image which presented this human rights instrument as introducing “same-sex marriage” 
and a “third sex,” as introducing “gender ideology” that would erode traditional family values 
and more generally Christian values in society. The government sided with the Church and 
29
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requested a preliminary interpretive ruling by the Constitutional Court prior to ratification. 
The public and political debate was foreclosed after the official ruling of Constitutional Court 
stipulating that some provisions from the Conventions (e.g. legal definitions of gender and its 
incorrect translation in Bulgaria) collided with the principle of the rule of law and legal 
certainty.31 Hence, the parliament is not allowed to ratify the Convention.                       
Meanwhile, the government also increased its support for the Church by allocating public 
funds for reconstruction and restoration of churches, inviting the Patriarch and the high 
clergy to participate in public events and commemorations beyond the strictly religious 
ceremonies (especially national and/or official  holidays, such as Liberation Day, on 3rd 
March, St. George’s Day on 6th May, the Day of the Slavic Bulgarian Alphabet on 24th May, 
etc.). The official ceremony and protocol of assuming public office is often practiced in the 
presence of the high clergy who bless the newly elected officials. (This is applied in various 
situations, from opening of the first session of the newly elected National Assembly, to the 
election of new government, and an inauguration ceremony for the new president assuming 
office; on a lower level, the same applies for the regional governors, mayors, city councils, 
etc. Additionally, under the State Protocol Act and the implementation regulation (Art. 87), in 
the order of formal precedence, the Patriarch enjoys the fifth position immediately after the 
president, the speaker of parliament, the prime-minister, and the vice-president, thus being 
treated ceremonially as a high level official, while official representatives of other religious 
denominations receive 28th place (of 29).    
   Further, the public visibility of the Church has increased as an aftermath of the 
engagement of a growing community of Christian intellectuals, academics, civic leaders with 
contemporary political and social issues. They participate in the public debates regarding the 
role of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Church in the society. The majority of this group embraces 
democratic values and principles and is closely associated with the modernization and 
democratization project of the country, including deepening the Euro-Atlantic cooperation 
and integration. Some of these intellectuals are involved in the publication of the academic 
journal Christianity and Culture32 or participate as frequent contributors, others are very 
31
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active in Orthodox Christian online platforms and portals such as Двери на Православието 
(Dveri na Pravoslavieto).33   
As an official recognition of the changed dynamic of church-state relations is the 2018 
and 2019 amendments in the 2002 Denominations Act, which provide for increased public 
funding of the two major religious communities, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the 
Muslim community. In principle, this type of public funding is open for each religious 
community that meets the requirement that at least 1% of the population self-identifies as 
belonging to the specific denomination in order to receive the funds.34 However, it was clear 
from the beginning that only the Orthodox Church and the Muslim community can qualify 
and receive larger funds (10 Bulgarian leva, or 5 EUR, per member). Funds allocated by the 
state budget include salaries of the clergy, salaries of other servants in the religious institution 
and funding for (re) construction and restoration of religious buildings. In practice, these 
provisions provide preferential treatment for the largest religious communities, offering tens 
of millions in tax-payer money. According to the 2020 State Budget Act, the Bulgarian 
Patriarchate will receive 26 million leva and the major Muslim community will receive 
approx. 6 million. Only limited funds are available for the rest of the denominations (the 
Catholic Church 70,000, Protestant denominations 160,000, Jewish community  70,000).35 
One of the problems with this allocation of public funds is that it relies on the data provided 
by the national statistics (2011 national census), not on real number of practicing believers. 
From this approach the two major religious communities benefit most. It is well established 
that self-identification as Orthodox Christian has more to do with ethno-national and cultural 
identity than with regular religious practice and observance of rituals. Thus, less than 10% of 
people who identify as Orthodox Christians in the country engage in real religious practice, 
while the Church receive budget funds for the total number. It is quite different from the 
Catholics and Protestants, who publicly share their religious identity only if they are 
practicing and feel connected to the religious community. Yet another problem of this 
allocation is that Protestant denominations are not unified under a single governing body: 
they belong to different doctrinal traditions, but receive the public funds as a whole (under 
the budget law). 
33
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In a nutshell, under the law, the government has increased its control and oversight in the 
process of allocation of funds which should be administered by the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Council of Ministers). This development, however, was welcomed by the Church 
itself, and was interpreted in terms of good cooperation, real commitment and care on behalf 
of the government. In fact, both sides–the Church and the state–look at this new framework 
as a mutually benefiting scheme; the privileged position of the Church in society is ensured, 
along with continuing support to the government and public blessing of its activities on 
behalf of the Church. Publicly expressed fears by some Orthodox intellectuals and lay 
religious groups state that this may lead to the politicization of the Church. They fear its 
transformation into a semi-governmental department of religious services are not addressed 
either from the ecclesiastical governing bodies, or from the governmental offices.          
The last example of the privileged treatment of the BOC by the state relates to the 
restrictive measures imposed by the government and sanitary authorities in order to contain 
the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 13, 2020, the Bulgarian parliament, on the proposal by 
the Council of Ministers, adopted a state of emergency decision (a constitutionally grounded 
form of a state of exception). This happened for the first time in the last 30 years of 
democratic politics. A week later, on March 20th, the parliament adopted a new emergency 
law that stipulated specific measures and policies that will be exercised in order to preserve 
the functioning of key institutions during the pandemic and ensure adequate and timely 
sanitary measures. Based on this legal framework, the minister of health issued orders that 
introduced measures of social distancing, banned certain economic activities, and imposed 
some restrictions on the freedom of assembly and freedom of movement.36  Adults were not 
allowed to gather freely even on the streets or public parks (which were closed), with the 
exception of having up to two adults together with social distancing (two meters). In line with 
these rules, almost all of the religious organizations in the country decided to close their 
worship places entirely or allow only private prayers or on-line broadcasted religious services 
without participation of the lay people; not the Bulgarian church, however. During the entire 
Lenten period (eight weeks of fasting and intensive worship before Easter), which coincided 
with the peak of the pandemic, the Orthodox churches remained not only open for the laity 
for private prayer, but also allowed all religious services with the participation of the lay 
people. There were several attempts on behalf of the government and the sanitary authorities 
36
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to change this position. After an official meeting held by the members of the Holy Synod and 
representatives of the government (the deputy prime-minister, the chairman of the national 
crisis staff, and the director of Directorate of Religious Affairs) only limited sanitary 
measures were agreed upon (wearing of face masks in the churches, regular sanitation and 
disinfection in churches, only very few services to be celebrated in front of the churches 
during the most intensive worship hours, limiting communion sacrament only to people who 
have personal connection to the parish and are well-known to the parish priests).37  In a 
further attempt to request the Synod to apply stricter sanitary measures and to limit 
participation of lay people in worship (to avoid public gathering as required by the general 
rules), another meeting with the Synod was convened, attended by the prime-minister, 
minister of health, and the director of Directorate of Religious Affairs.38 Nevertheless, the 
Synod did not agree to implement such stricter measures. This approach was unlike Greece or 
other Orthodox jurisdictions which implemented very restrictive polices concerning religious 
services, either closing churches for public worship, or allowing only online streaming of 
services celebrated only by the clergy (lay people absent).39  This latter case is illustrative of 
the privileged position of the Church which succeeded to place itself above legitimate and 
mandatory rules and decisions issued by the government in order to prevent and contain the 
pandemic in time of national emergency. Only the Orthodox Church enjoyed preferential 
treatment that was refused to other denominations. When the Church is concerned, general 
rules and orders issued by the government do not apply.  
The current situation of close church-state cooperation raises even more profound 
questions related to the quality of democratization in the country. Given the continuing 
erosion of democratic standards and the rule of law, Bulgaria remains at the bottom among 
the EU countries when democratic consolidation and the rule of law are considered.40 The 
37
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close ties between the Church leadership and the incumbent government are often used for 
legitimation of power in the eyes of the wider public. Though the intensive cooperation 
between the Church and the state is often interpreted in terms of mutual benefit, serious 
doubts remain whether this is beneficial for the believers and citizens of the country at large. 
The general impression remains that these are negotiated benefits in the sole interest of the 
powerholders.    
 
Conclusion 
In the last decades of democratization, though the quality of democratic process 
remains low, there are several developments regarding to the legal status of the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church. First, after the fall of the communist atheist regime, the Church enjoyed 
the right of free practice of its rituals, increasing its public presence, and engaging with 
missionary and charity work. These opportunities, however, were not fully realized, due to 
the internal church divisions, which weakened its role in society and eroded the public trust. 
Nonetheless, the traditional religion status of the Eastern Orthodoxy was constitutionally 
recognized since the beginning of the period of the 1991 Constitution. Second, after 
overcoming of the internal schismatic movement with the assistance of the state in the early 
2000s, the Church is gradually increasing its public influence and attracting more public 
support, increasing social trust, while at the same time, the society remains deeply 
secularized, and the number of regularly practicing Orthodox Christians has not increased 
significantly (constantly remaining below 10 % of the believers). In 2002, with the adoption 
of new Denominations Act, the Bulgarian Patriarchate received ex lege recognition and 
privileged legal status, thus supporting its position during internal church struggles and 
enhancing its role vis-a-vis the state and society. After overcoming the schism with the aid of 
the government, the Church entered a period of increased public presence with the 
opportunity to influence the legislative process and governmental decisions, while receiving 
constant support on behalf of the state on many different occasions (from public funding for 
construction and reconstruction of churches, to taking into account many synodical opinions 
on legislation and different policies). Third, the privileged legal status of the Church has been 
further enhanced with the 2019 legislation which provides public funding for paying the 
salaries of all the clergy and other church servants, along with providing sufficient funding 
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020 Report, Bulgaria: https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-
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for construction and maintaining of church buildings. The privileged position of the Orthodox 
Church is even more visible now, when in times of strict measures addressing the COVID-19 
pandemic, in the midst of constitutional state of officially declared emergency, the Church 
alone among all other religious communities has been allowed to celebrate all its feasts and 
rituals with the participation of the laity. All facts and developments interpreted 
simultaneously, taking into account gradual changes in law and the raising public influence 
of the Church, lead to the conclusion that the public status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
is elevated to that of official religion, compared to the more moderate traditional religion 
status constitutionally mandated in the beginning of the period.                 
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